In May 2024, a homemade bomb was lobbed into a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurant in Baghdad. The next day, masked men stormed another KFC, trashing the American fast-food chain due to its perceived support for Israel. For months before this, mortars targeted the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and American troops in the region faced over 160 attacks following October 7, 2023. And since that same date, over hundreds of miles of Iraqi roadways, enormous billboards have been erected featuring U.S. President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu splattered with blood. They are captioned: “Desecrators of Allah’s People.”

In Iraq, disdain for anything associated with the U.S. is not new. But from recent attacks on Baghdad’s KFCs to the U.S. embassy, a new motivating factor seems to have emerged: the situation in the Gaza Strip, which has exacerbated tensions and changed regional dynamics. Gaza is hundreds of miles from Baghdad, but thanks to the war’s atrocities made visible by the internet, many Iraqis are outraged; at the Israeli government for committing them, but also at the U.S. government for arming and funding them.

“The Gaza war is having a significant impact on Iraqi politics,” says Lahib Higel, the Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Iraq. Higel notes that before Israel's war on Gaza, there had been a year-long truce during which Iran-backed militias, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), agreed to stop attacking U.S. bases in Iraq to support the stabilization of the newly established Iraqi government. However, the truce was broken because of America's unconditional support for Israel, which led to a series of militia attacks against the U.S. military across Iraq. “The Gaza war was the ignition [of the attacks]. But these Iran-backed groups also used the escalation to revive the pressure on the Iraqi government to expedite a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country.”

Experts like Higel argue that the tiny Gaza Strip has become geopolitical tannerite. After a rocket attack against the American embassy earlier this year, a PMF leader issued a statement claiming that his militias wouldn’t stop as long as “Zionist crimes continue in Gaza and the American occupation continues in Iraq.”

“My grandfather hated Iran. My father hates America. I hate them both,” says Ali, our 21-year-old Iraqi taxi driver, as he races down Route Irish at breakneck speed. Route Irish is the notorious road connecting Baghdad International Airport with the city, a route once laced with crude explosives and infested with heavily-armed insurgents waiting to ambush coalition forces. But today it’s mostly quiet—except for Ali’s rickety cab, which blares Iraqi rap while he scrolls through TikTok.

“There’s a lot of talk these days about Iran or America and which country Iraq will align itself with,” he explains. “I really don’t want either. America wants our oil and resources, and Iran just wants us as a puppet. I say fuck them both. We Iraqis want to build this country for us. Not for the Iranians or the Americans. But then again, if I had to choose, I would choose Iran. The Americans destroyed my country, and now they’re helping Netanyahu destroy Palestine.”

It is dusk, and the sun slips away beneath the murky brown haze hanging over downtown Baghdad. “See those? Get used to them. They’re everywhere,” Ali points out the dozens of murals and billboards along Route Irish depicting solemn portraits of Iranian military officer Qasem Soleimani, assassinated right there on Route Irish by a 2020 Donald Trump-issued drone strike, captioned, “The Blood of Our Martyrs Will Not Be Forgotten.”

“Iran and America both want control over my country,” Ali glances at another Soleimani mural outside the cab, “but Iran already has it.” 

The most obvious example of Iranian influence are the many armed Shia militias, backed by Tehran, which roam Iraq under the umbrella of PMF. Furious over U.S. support for Israel’s assault on Gaza, the PMF has responded with a litany of attacks against the Americans. However, when Iran ordered the PMF to disengage, the militias obeyed. According to Slovenian International Relations expert Dr. Primož Šterbenc, this is largely because Iran isn’t interested in a wider war with Israel and the U.S., thus explaining why it ordered the PMF to stand down—for now. Nonetheless, despite hesitation on the part of the Biden administration amidst hawkish cries for retaliation against Iran, the U.S. Navy is deploying warships to deter Iran in case of war.

Šterbenc argues that, when it comes to the scenario of wider conflict between Iran and the U.S. and Israel, “the Iraqi Shia militias themselves are aware…they would end up being militarily greatly weakened. However, the situation will still remain unstable as long as Israel's ultra-brutal military operation against Gaza continues, because the Iraqi militias will want to show their solidarity with Gaza through military actions.”

Earlier this month Iran fired 200 ballistic missiles toward Israel. And since then, Iran-linked militias in Iraq have been ramping up action against Israel as well, springing roughly 40 attacks—consisting of an assortment of missiles, drones and rockets—in the past two weeks. 

Iran's influence, Šterbenc explains, has been very visible in recent months through Tehran’s ability to curb attacks by Shia militias on American targets in Iraq. On January 28 this year, when a Kata’ib Hezbollah drone—a militia part of the PMF—killed three American soldiers at the Tower 22 base in Jordan, Ismail Al Kani, the commander of Iran's Al Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, quickly arrived in Baghdad and pressured Kataib Hezbollah to announce a suspension of its attacks on American targets.

The PMF didn’t officially exist before 2014, back when it was nothing more than a ragtag umbrella group of various Shia militias. It was not particularly organized, nor very influential. Then came the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which began seizing huge chunks of land it was declaring as part of its new Islamic caliphate. 

The Obama administration was reluctant to get tangled up in Iraq so soon after it had withdrawn all American troops in 2011.  As officials deliberated in Washington, and after ISIS seized the city of Mosul, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa, calling for Iraqis to join together, take up arms and fight ISIS to save their country. Shia militias united to wage war against the Sunni jihadists, and thus, the PMF was formed.

“I thought ISIS would take Baghdad,” says Sawada al-Nassif, a Baghdad resident and mother of four. “I was telling my husband we should leave the country, go to Jordan. But then the PMF started fighting ISIS and won back our country.”

Today, the PMF is an auxiliary to the official Iraqi military; its fighters are paid equal salaries and benefits to military personnel and it is widely considered Iraq’s second army. Now, the PMF is also a leading political force after winning 101 out of 285 provincial seats in Iraq’s December 2023 elections. Because Sunnis are minorities in Iraq, and as the predominantly Shia PMF gain a stronger foothold in Iraqi politics, some Sunnis aren’t too happy. 

“Under Saddam (Hussein), we Sunnis at least held more political power than (Shias),” said Omar al-Dulaimi, a Sunni resident of Fallujah. “Now we are losing influence in government while still being the minority. I don’t like it.” 

With ISIS now driven into dormancy, the PMF is focused on its political aspirations. Among those is to see the expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq. The American military has lingered in Iraq since ISIS roared back to life in 2014—and it remains at the invitation of the government in Baghdad. Higel states that the Gaza war has not developed in Washington's favor in Iraq, however, putting tremendous pressure on the government from the PMF to end the American presence in Baghdad.

Experts, including Higel, agree that the PMF operates as an extension of the Iraqi state. In 2016, the government designated the PMF as an ‘independent military formation' within the Iraqi armed forces. For Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, it's a political tightrope act: balancing his government's relations with the United States, and the PMF, some of whose militias have been designated as terrorist groups by the U.S.A.

“You’re American,” says Ahmed, an Iraqi friend of mine, as we sipped tea on Baghdad’s crowded Mutanabbi Street. “I know you’re American. You know you’re American. Nobody else should know you’re American.” Ahmed quietly advised me to keep my nationality under wraps. But why? Because of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003? Ahmed said no. “Your country has kept Israel’s genocide alive,” he said. “Normal people here won’t hold that against you specifically. But the militias outside Baghdad, well, it’s possible they might.” Ahmed also reminded me that ISIS had launched several small attacks in the last week, and outside Baghdad, I may be at a higher risk. 

But when myself and my European colleague, at a PMF-run checkpoint outside Baghdad, encounter one of these militias ourselves, things go differently than how Ahmed had prophesied. 

“You are American?” asks a bearded PMF militant with an assault rifle, as he studies the passport I hand him through a cab window. I nod and admit that I am. He looks me up and down, before asking if I work for the government. No, I answer. “Good,” he nods. “I don’t like your government.”

In the Iraqi city of Najaf, a local scholar, Rajab al-Hasen, stands on the side of the road and explains the recently-erected signage. One image features an expressionless face of President Biden, flecked with fake blood, peering down at rubble-strewn Gaza. About twenty meters down the road from that sign is another one, featuring not Biden, but Netanyahu. 

“This sort of imagery and messaging is all over Iraq, from north to south,” al-Hasen explains. “None of it was here before Israel began its genocide in Gaza. That war has really changed things around here.” 

Even at the height of Iraq’s civil war and its bloody sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis over a decade ago, a shared disdain for Israeli politics remained a uniting belief. “We are familiar with war and occupation,” says activist Naseera el-Sham. “Iraqis can empathize with Syrians, Yemenis, Afghans, but most of all Palestinians.”

Iraqi society’s aversion to Israel is not a belief inherited from Iran. In 1948, 1967 and again in 1973, Iraq partook in wars against Israel. Even after the 2003 regime change which ousted Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq’s official position on the state of Israel didn’t change. 

Natalia Reinharz, an Israeli lecturer on foreign policy based in Jerusalem, says that Gaza hasn’t shifted what has been Iraq’s mainstream position on Israel. What it has done, she argues, has given Iran an in. “The United States has stubbornly stood by Netanyahu’s side for a year of barbaric war,” Reinharz says. “Not only will the war hurt Israel in the long term, but it's a critical foreign policy mistake from the Biden administration.”

“If Washington wanted to retain influence not just in Iraq, but within the Arab and Muslim states, it would have reined Netanyahu in by now. But they haven’t, and that has made Arab states more open to exploring alliances to nations other than the U.S.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. presidential election casts a long shadow. Iranian historian Kazem Ershadi echoes Reinharz’ sentiment, and adds that “a lot will depend on whether the U.S. and Iran will continue to negotiate behind the scenes with the help of Oman. Iran would need to agree to limiting its uranium enrichment, and the U.S. would need to relax economic sanctions against Iran. In other words, it may be possible for the U.S. and Iran to find a balance in Iraq, but not very likely against the backdrop of Gaza.”

But common ground between the U.S. and Iran seems like a pipe dream, especially now. Gaza has been a rubble-strewn warzone for over a year, Israel has invaded Lebanon, and tension with Iran has, again, crescendoed so much that whispers of an all-out regional war permeate every conversation regarding the Middle East. Israel keeps on erasing previous red lines, barreling closer to a reality that consists of bombs raining down in Tehran, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, the Biden administration continues to pour billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry into Israel.

Netanyahu – Israel’s longest-serving prime minister – is well-aware that U.S. support won’t wane, and so he keeps his foot on the gas. He also understands that the U.S., while busy with an election, will not resort to any measure drastic enough to force his hand. (Israel attacked Lebanon, and it did so without first getting approval from the country that underwrites most of its national security, the United States). 

“The timing of Israel invading Lebanon is, at the very least, curious,” Reinharz says. “Biden is clearly an ultra-Zionist who will not, no matter what, rein Israel in. But I still think that, despite this, Netanyahu and his far-right government would prefer Donald Trump in the Oval Office. I think he timed this escalation with the U.S. election for a reason.” Reinharz argues that a Trump administration would greenlight virtually any course of action Netanyahu wants to take, however radical, including the official annexation of the West Bank. “Trump’s campaign is partially bankrolled by (Miriam) Adelson, a Zionist billionaire who has donated millions to Trump. She’s helping Trump fund his campaign because she wants Israel to have the West Bank, without a Palestinian Authority or any peace accords. And she knows Trump would let that happen.” 

Reinharz and I first met in Jordan. We were sipping tea on a rooftop in Amman, listening to the day’s final call to prayer echo through the city. She took a long, slow drag of her cigarette, then predicted, with unnerving accuracy, what is happening now. 

“You watch,” she told me, her voice dripping with cynicism. “Netanyahu would rather have Trump than Biden. I bet he will escalate the war in the fall, when the polls are tight. Netanyahu will make it messy, and he will make sure the average American voter knows it's messy over here. That way blame is cast on Biden, and Trump can position himself as the anti-war, solution-bearing candidate. It’s what Netanyahu wants—Trump. Watch. You’ll see.” 

Dr. Šterbenc added that a Trump victory in the upcoming U.S. presidential elections could “change everything.” That’s because Trump would likely govern in the interests of Israel, like Biden does now and like Trump did as president, while pressuring Iran even more. After May 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA—also known as the Iran nuclear deal—and began his “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran. Trump crippled the Iranian economy after slapping over 1,500 sanctions on banking, oil exports and shipping, and assassinated Soleimani in 2020, who was in Baghdad fighting ISIS at the time.

“Trump could greatly increase tensions and consequently convince the Iranian authorities that they must develop nuclear weapons,” Šterbenc said. “Trump ripped up Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal, so this is more possible than ever. This would then be exploited by Israel with accusations against Iran, escalating the possibility of full-blown regional war.”

Mustafa al-Tamimi sits on a blanket with his wife, Fatima, and their three children on the banks of the Tigris. It is a warm, breezy Friday evening in May, and the young family is one of many who have gathered along the river for a communal celebration. I ask Mustafa what they are celebrating. 

“We are celebrating life,” he says as though it were obvious. “In Iraq, we know death, and so we appreciate life while it's still here.” Mustafa and his family aren’t particularly religious, but still identify with Islam’s core tenants. “Islam teaches us to love people, whoever they are. So, for me, I love the Palestinians. I also love the Israelis, the Americans, and, of course,” he smiles at his wife, “I love Iraqis.”

Mustafa’s opinion is in the minority, he thinks. “The world doesn’t think the way I do. Look at Palestine. Look at Gaza. Let me ask this: if Gaza were in France, the U.S. or Israel, and instead of Palestinians in Gaza, it were French, Americans or Israelis, then do you think the bombs would still be falling? Would children be starving to death? No. The war would be over.”

He tears up, though only momentarily, while we discuss Gaza. “They are saying Iran is gaining strong influence over Iraq, much more influence than the Americans,” he said. “I think this is true. It seems like the reality I am seeing every day. And so what if it is? At least Iran isn’t in on the genocide.”∎